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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this appeal, Coltec Industries, Inc. ("Coltec") seeks to 
extricate itself from its voluntary dismissal with prejudice of 
its claim against the United Mine Workers of America 
Combined Benefit Fund and its trustees (collectively"the 
Fund") that asserted that the Coal Industry Retiree Health 
Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act), 26 U.S.C. SS 9701-9722 
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(2001), was unconstitutional. Subsequent to that dismissal, 
the Supreme Court in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 
498 (1997), declared the Coal Act unconstitutional as 
applied to companies in situations similar to Coltec. Coltec 
then filed motions in the District Court under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 60(b) seeking to reinstate its 
constitutional claims. The District Court viewed Coltec as 
seeking to escape the effects of its earlier agreements in 
order to benefit from the ruling in Eastern and denied 
Coltec's attempt to reassert its constitutional claims or to 
have its liability for Coal Act premiums reduced to zero. The 
District Court also ordered Coltec to pay to the Fund 
$7,129,090.97 in premiums and interest. Coltec appeals 
the rulings of the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Congress enacted the Coal Act to resolve the imminent 
insolvency of multi-employer trusts created by coal- 
industry agreements to provide health benefits for coal 
miners and their dependents. The background of the Coal 
Act is thoroughly reviewed in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 
524 U.S. 498, 504-14 (1997), and thereafter in Unity Real 
Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 653-54 (3d Cir. 1999), 
and in Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trustees of the UMWA 
Combined Benefit Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 521-22 (6th Cir. 
2001). We thus summarize only the particular provisions 
and facts relevant to the case before us. 
 
The Coal Act merged existing trusts into the appellee 
United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund 
and charged the Fund's trustees with collecting premiums 
from the former employers of eligible retirees and using 
those premiums to pay the retirees' benefits. Under the Act, 
the Commissioner of Social Security assigns retirees to 
their former employers, and the Fund charges premiums 
based on these assignments. 
 
Coltec was assigned 249 retirees as of February 1, 1993, 
and the Fund assessed premiums against the company, 
which made its first two monthly payments (totaling 
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$139,496.36), under protest.1 App. at 232. That November, 
Coltec and two other companies, Four Leaf Coal Co. and 
L.G. Wasson Coal Mining Corp., sued the Fund seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief (including a 
contemporaneous motion for a temporary restraining order) 
from further assessments of Coal Act premiums against 
them. App. at 19-42. The first four counts of the complaint 
claimed that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to 
them under the Fifth Amendment's takings and due 
process clauses because the plaintiff companies had not 
signed the relevant agreements. They later added a fifth 
count alleging errors in the assignments of beneficiaries to 
them. 
 
In December 1993, the parties executed an agreement 
(the "Agreement"), App. at 236-37, under which the 
plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their request for a temporary 
restraining order. Coltec agreed to establish an escrow 
account into which it would deposit all premiums due 
during the pendency of its preliminary injunction motion. 
The terms were established in a contemporaneous separate 
written agreement (the "Escrow Agreement"). App. at 232- 
35. In return, the Fund agreed to deem Coltec's payments 
into escrow as payments to the Fund and not to treat the 
other plaintiffs' failure to pay as a default.2 The Agreement 
provided that the escrow funds, plus interest, would be 
disbursed to the Fund if the injunction motion was denied 
or to Coltec if it was granted. 
 
In January 1994, the Fund answered the complaint and 
counterclaimed, seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the 
Coal Act was constitutional. Later that month, the United 
States intervened to defend the Act's constitutionality. In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Coltec paid under protest on the ground that the Coal Act was 
unconstitutional as applied to it because it did not participate in the 
negotiations for the 1974 or any subsequent National Bituminous Coal 
Wage Agreements and did not in any other way agree to make 
contributions under these agreements. App. at 24. 
 
2. Although the complaint was filed by all three coal companies as 
plaintiffs, and they all entered into the Agreement (but not the Escrow 
Agreement), depending on the context we will refer only to Coltec as its 
claims are the only ones at issue in this appeal. 
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May 1996, Coltec and the other two plaintiffs withdrew 
their preliminary injunction motion, and the District Court 
dismissed that motion. App. at 126. 
 
Meanwhile, several courts of appeals, including this one, 
held that the Coal Act was constitutional as applied to coal 
operators similarly situated to Coltec. See Eastern 
Enterprises v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 1997); Holland 
v. Keenan Trucking Co., 102 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Carbon Fuel Co. v. USX Corp., 100 F.3d 1124 (4th Cir. 
1996); Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 90 F.3d 688 (3d 
Cir. 1996); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Shalala (In re Blue 
Diamond Coal Co.), 79 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1996); Davon, Inc. 
v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114 (7th Cir. 1996); LTV Steel Co. v. 
Shalala (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 
1995). The Supreme Court had denied certiorari in Blue 
Diamond, 519 U.S. 516 (1997), Davon, 519 U.S. 808 (1996), 
and Chateaugay, 516 U.S. 913 (1995). Constitutional 
challenges by other coal companies were still pending when 
the plaintiff companies initiated settlement negotiations 
with the Fund. See, e.g., Eastern Enterprises, 110 F.3d 150, 
rev'd, 524 U.S. 498 (1998); Mary Helen Coal Corp. v. 
Hudson, 976 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Va. 1997), rev'd, 164 F.3d 
624 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 
On June 30, 1997, prior to the resolution of the pending 
constitutional challenges in other cases, the parties in this 
case signed a stipulation (the "Stipulation") which 
referenced a decision by the Alabama federal court that 
resolved a dispute as to the amount of premiums to be 
assessed under the Coal Act. That decision was affirmed by 
the Eleventh Circuit. National Coal Ass'n v. Chater, No. 
CV94-H-780-S, 1995 WL 1052240 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd, 81 
F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 1996) ("NCA"). The Stipulation also 
referenced the then-pending follow-up case, National Mining 
Ass'n v. Chater, No. CV-96-N-1385-S (N.D. Ala. 1996) 
("NMA"), in which coal companies sought a refund of the 
differential between the amount they had paid over a period 
of several years and the amount they would have paid 
under the NCA formula (the "premium differential"). The 
Stipulation stated: 
 
       plaintiffs seek either to obtain the benefits of the NMA 
       litigation, should the outcome be favorable to the 
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       plaintiffs in that action, or to retain the right to litigate 
       the issue themselves should the outcome of the NMA 
       litigation be unfavorable to the plaintiffs in that case. 
 
App. at 128. 
 
Specifically, the Stipulation provided that: (1) plaintiffs 
would amend their complaint to state a new claim seeking 
the premium differential, (2) defendants would not oppose 
this amendment, (3) plaintiffs would dismiss with prejudice 
their five existing claims, (4) the parties would ask the court 
to stay the premium differential claim pending resolution of 
the NMA litigation, and (5) upon a final judgment in NMA: 
 
       a) if the said final judgment . . . is favorable to 
       plaintiffs in that case, then [the Fund] will afford 
       plaintiffs in this case the same treatment of [its] new 
       claim . . . as is afforded to the plaintiffs in the NMA 
       litigation; and b) if the said final judgment . . . is 
       favorable to defendants in that case, the stay imposed 
       on the new claim for relief . . . will be lifted, and 
       plaintiffs will be free to pursue that claim . . . and [the 
       Fund] will be free to defend . . . against that claim. 
 
App. at 129-30. In other words, the plaintiff companies 
would get the benefit of any decision determining that their 
premiums should have been lower but could litigate that 
point if the Alabama court found otherwise. Pursuant to the 
Stipulation, the plaintiff companies amended their 
complaint to include a new sixth count that concerned the 
premium differential issue, App. at 132-38, 147-53, and 
dismissed the first five counts with prejudice. The District 
Court "so ordered" the Stipulation on July 2, 1997. The 
District Court then granted the parties' joint motion to stay 
this case pending the resolution of NMA. 
 
On October 20, 1997, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit holding the Coal Act constitutional. Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel, 522 U.S. 931 (1997) (granting writ of 
certiorari). On June 25, 1998, the Court found the Coal Act 
unconstitutional as applied to companies which had not 
signed relevant coal-industry agreements. Eastern, 524 U.S. 
498 (1998). The decision in Eastern was"splintered." Unity 
Real Estate Co., 178 F.3d at 658. Five Justices found the 
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Act unconstitutional as applied to companies who, like 
Eastern and Coltec, had not signed the relevant coal- 
industry agreements. Only four of those Justices believed 
that, applied to such companies, the Act was an 
unconstitutional taking, Eastern, 524 U.S. at 529-37 
(plurality opinion), while the fifth believed the Act violated 
due process but was not a taking, id. at 539-50 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring and dissenting). The other four Justices 
would have held that the Coal Act was constitutional as 
applied to such companies. Id. at 550-53 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); id. at 553-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 
Shortly after Eastern was decided, the plaintiff companies 
in this case filed three motions in an attempt to avoid Coal 
Act liability. The first motion requested leave to file a new 
complaint restating the dismissed constitutional claims and 
altering the sixth count to claim zero premium liability. The 
second asked for relief under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(5) or (6) from the dismissal of the first five 
counts of the complaint which challenged the 
constitutionality of the Coal Act. The third motion sought to 
lift the stay of count six (the premium differential). App. at 
155-87. On November 9, 1998, while the motions were 
pending, the Social Security Administration wrote to Coltec 
voiding Coltec's assignments in light of Eastern  (the "SSA 
letter"). App. at 201. 
 
The District Court denied the three motions on January 
25, 1999. App. at 188-95. The District Court held that the 
Eastern decision did not provide a basis for relieving Coltec 
of the consequences of its bargain. The court also denied 
Coltec's subsequent motion for "limited reconsideration" 
based on the SSA letter, finding that the letter, which 
Coltec received before the January order, was not new 
evidence, and that Coltec's reliance on the letter was merely 
another attempt to reassert the claims it had bargained 
away. App. at 204. 
 
In May 1999, the NMA parties reached a settlement with 
the Fund under which the Fund agreed to pay back the 
premium differential without interest. Supp. App. at 388- 
93. The Fund, which had agreed in the Stipulation to give 
Coltec the benefit of NMA if the coal companies were 
successful in that litigation, offered to offset Coltec's 
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premium differential against Coltec's release of the escrow 
money, but Coltec denied any liability. Supp. App. at 394- 
95, 400-03. The Fund then filed a motion asking the 
District Court to order disbursement of the funds that were 
believed to be in escrow, App. at 219-20, at which time 
Coltec first revealed that it had not in fact established an 
escrow account as it had represented. App. at 287-88. The 
District Court granted the Fund's motion on July 20, 2000 
and ordered Coltec to pay directly to the Fund over $7 
million in premiums and interest3 which should have been 
in escrow. App. at 297-303. Coltec timely appealed. 4 
 
Thereafter, the District Court directed the parties to file 
dispositive motions.5 It ruled on those motions on 
December 4, 2000, issuing a final judgment dismissing the 
Fund's counterclaims as moot and granting Coltec 
summary judgment on its premium differential claim. App. 
at 370-78. Specifically, the District Court found that Coltec 
had made a bargain to forego all challenges to its 
underlying Coal Act premium liability in exchange for the 
opportunity to (1) claim the premium differential and (2) 
gain the benefit of a favorable NMA result while (3) retaining 
the right to litigate the premium differential issue itself 
should the NMA outcome be unfavorable to its position. 
 
The court also reiterated its understanding of the parties' 
deal when it granted the Fund's motion to order 
disbursement of the escrow funds. It rejected Coltec's 
argument that the Fund had no right to premiums due to 
the SSA letter, treating it as another effort by Coltec to 
renege on its concession of liability in the Stipulation. In 
response to Coltec's argument that the Agreement required 
denial of Coltec's initial injunction motion to trigger 
disbursement of the escrow to the Fund, the District Court 
found that Coltec's withdrawal and its dismissal of its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The order allowed Coltec to offset its payment by the amount of the 
premium differential (approximately $150,000). 
 
4. We need not decide if we have jurisdiction over that appeal because it 
has been consolidated with Coltec's later appeal of the final judgment. 
 
5. Around this time, Four Leaf and Wasson settled with the Fund, 
although the District Court acknowledged that nothing had been entered 
into the record regarding these settlements. App. at 314, 371 n.2. 
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injunction motion satisfied this condition. Morever, the 
court held that Coltec's failure to make the agreed upon 
payments into escrow did not excuse its obligation to pay 
the amount that should have been (and was represented to 
be) in escrow.6 
 
The District Court held that because the NMA result was 
undisputedly favorable to Coltec, the Stipulation limited the 
relief to that afforded the NMA plaintiffs, which necessarily 
meant that count six was limited to the premium 
differential and that Coltec could not use count six as a 
vehicle for recalculating its premiums to zero. The court did 
award Coltec a $152,717.92 offset against the money it 
owed the Fund and stayed the judgment pending Coltec's 
appeal, which this court consolidated with the company's 
earlier appeal.7 
 
II. 
 
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD 
 
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction and 
this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The 
parties disagree as to the standard of review we should 
apply to the District Court's treatment of the Stipulation, 
with the Fund advocating a clearly erroneous standard and 
Coltec advocating a plenary standard. We note that our 
result in this case would be the same under either 
standard. This court applies plenary review to a district 
court's construction of settlement agreements, but should 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We note our surprise that there is no reference in the record to any 
sanction imposed by the District Court on Coltec or its attorney for what 
appears to be years of falsely representing the establishment and 
existence of an escrow fund, although the District Court did find the 
conduct "troubling." App. at 302 n.1. 
 
7. On March 27, 2001, the Fund wrote to Coltec and Wasson, offering a 
partial refund of the premiums they had paid, pursuant to a fund set up 
by Congress for partially reimbursing companies in their position in the 
wake of Eastern. Letter from George E. McGrann, Attorney for Coltec, to 
the Court (May 9, 2001) (enclosing letter from Carl F. Tennille, 
Comptroller for Health and Retirement Funds (March 27, 2001)) (on file 
in Clerk's office). 
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review a district court's interpretation of settlement 
agreements, as well as any underlying factual findings, for 
clear error, as it would in reviewing a district court's 
treatment of any other contract. See, e.g., In re Cendant 
Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2000) 
("[B]asic contract principles . . . apply to settlement 
agreements [and] . . . contract interpretation is a question 
of fact, [thus] . . . review is according to the clearly 
erroneous standard. In contrast, contract construction, that 
is, the legal operation of the contract, is a question of law 
mandating plenary review."). We review the denial of Rule 
60(b) relief for an abuse of discretion. Rolo v. City Investing 
Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 653 (3d Cir. 1998).8 
 
III. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
On appeal, Coltec makes several challenges to the 
District Court's rulings. Primarily, however, the company 
asserts that the District Court misinterpreted the 
Stipulation, abused its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) 
motion, and had no basis to award money to the Fund. 
Coltec seeks reversal of the $7,129,090.97 award to the 
Fund and asks us to instruct the District Court to order the 
Fund to refund the two premiums Coltec paid, with 
interest. In the alternative, Coltec asks this court to remand 
for another recalculation of its premium differential, but it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Coltec suggests review is plenary when a district court does not 
exercise its discretion, citing, inter alia, Twelve John Does v. District 
of 
Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988), for the proposition that 
a denial of Rule 60(b) relief should be reversed if it is based on an 
error 
of law. This is consistent with the abuse of discretion standard. See, 
e.g., 
Stokors S.A. v. Morrison, 147 F.3d 759, 761 (8th Cir. 1998) ("A district 
court necessarily abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an 
erroneous view of controlling law."). Coltec also argues courts have no 
discretion to deny a Rule 60(b) motion which is based on the 
unconstitutionality of the underlying judgment. See Boughner v. Sec'y of 
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978). The language 
Coltec relies on is dictum. This court reviewed such a denial for abuse 
of discretion in Marshall v. Board of Education , 575 F.2d 417, 422-24 (3d 
Cir. 1978). 
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does not respond to the Fund's assertions (1) that Coltec 
waived this issue by not raising it in the District Court and 
(2) that the credit is correctly calculated. The Fund defends 
the District Court's understanding of the parties' agreement 
and, along with the United States, asserts that the court 
properly denied Rule 60(b) relief.9 
 
A. Coltec's Coal Act Liability 
 
Coltec contends that it should prevail on this appeal even 
without the constitutional claims it voluntarily dismissed 
because its Coal Act liability is zero. Coltec argues that in 
light of the Stipulation the District Court abused its 
discretion in declining to lift the stay on count six and 
erred in holding that its resolution of that count was 
limited to the two options in the Stipulation. 
 
It is manifest that Coltec explicitly agreed in the 
Stipulation to dismiss with prejudice its first five counts, 
which stated constitutional challenges to the Coal Act and 
a statutory challenge to the company's assignments, 
thereby forfeiting these avenues of contesting its underlying 
liability. The District Court "so ordered" the Stipulation and 
the related dismissal and stay orders. In exchange for 
Coltec's abandonment of its challenges to its liability, the 
Fund agreed that Coltec could challenge the amount of its 
assessments by adding "a new claim for relief that will seek 
to reduce, by the amount of the premium differential[from 
NCA], the Coal Act premiums assessed against plaintiffs by 
[the Fund]." App. at 129. The plain language of the 
Stipulation thus confined the scope of this new sixth count. 
 
Coltec clearly understood this because its sixth count 
was narrowly drawn, alleging only that certain offsets due 
under the Coal Act were under-calculated, resulting in the 
premium differential, and requesting that the court order 
the Fund to recalculate its pre-1996 premiums according to 
the NCA method10 and release the premium differential plus 
interest to Coltec from the company's payments in escrow. 
As contemplated by the Stipulation, the sixth count did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The United States takes no position regarding the money judgment. 
Br. of United States at 10 n.1. 
 
10. From 1996 on, the Fund assessed all premiums according to NCA. 
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challenge either Coltec's assignments or its underlying 
premium liability based on these assignments. 
 
Moreover, the Stipulation restricted the District Court's 
ultimate resolution of the sixth count. It provided that the 
parties would ask to stay count six pending the resolution 
of NMA and then, if the resolution was favorable to the NMA 
plaintiffs, the Fund would give Coltec the same treatment 
regarding its premium differential claim as the NMA 
plaintiffs received.11 It also provided that if the outcome 
were favorable to the Fund, the stay on the sixth count 
would be lifted and the parties would be free to litigate the 
premium differential issue. The District Court's stay order 
recited this language. App. at 145-46. By voluntary 
agreement and subsequent court order, Coltec's sole 
remaining cause of action is confined to seeking the 
premium differential which the Fund has offered Coltec. 
The Stipulation precludes Coltec from contesting its 
underlying liability for Coal Act premiums. For this reason, 
Coltec cannot use count six to state a claim for zero liability 
or to request a refund of its two premium payments, and 
nothing in the SSA letter requires otherwise. Thus, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to lift 
the stay and properly denied Coltec's summary judgment 
request for relief beyond that afforded the NMA  plaintiffs. 
 
B. Coltec's Rule 60(b) Motion 
 
"The general purpose of Rule 60(b) . . . is to strike a 
proper balance between the conflicting principles that 
litigation must be brought to an end and that justice must 
be done." Boughner v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572 
F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978). Coltec contends that the 
denial of relief in this case was an abuse of discretion and 
that relief is warranted under either Rule 60(b)(5) or 
60(b)(6). The relevant portions of the rule provide: 
 
       (b) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
       court may relieve a party or a party's legal 
       representative from a final judgment, order, or 
       proceeding for the following reasons: . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. On appeal, Coltec does not contest that under the Stipulation the 
settlement terminating the NMA case was a resolution favorable to the 
NMA plaintiffs. 
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        (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
       discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 
       has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
       longer equitable that the judgment should have 
       prospective application; or 
 
        (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
       operation of the judgment. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.12 Coltec based its motion in the District 
Court for relief from the dismissal with prejudice of the first 
five counts of its complaint on these subsections, and now 
appeals the District Court's denial of this motion. 
 
1. Subsection (5) 
 
This court has held that "[t]he definitional limitation in 
subsection (5) is significant in that it empowers a court to 
modify a judgment only if it is `prospective,' or executory." 
Marshall v. Bd. of Educ, 575 F.2d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 1978). 
The District Court held that its dismissal with prejudice of 
the first five counts does not satisfy the "prospective" 
requirement of this section. Coltec argues that because 
there was no money judgment against it at the time of its 
Rule 60(b) motion, an order allowing it to reassert its 
constitutional claims would have resulted in a finding that 
it had no Coal Act liability, which would have given it relief 
from the prospective application of the Stipulation. It 
asserts that, therefore, the District Court's finding that the 
dismissal was not prospective was erroneous and that the 
court abused its discretion by failing to weigh the equities 
of the company's motion. 
 
As an initial matter, Coltec's motion asked for relief from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The United States argues that Coltec's Rule 60(b) motion is moot 
because the motion seeks to reinstate claims challenging the 
constitutionality of the Coal Act despite the fact that the government has 
already declared Coltec's assignments void and agreed that further 
assessments against Coltec are inappropriate. However, if we found the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying Coltec's request for Rule 
60(b) relief, it could affect Coltec's right to the premium payments it 
made (and was supposed to put in escrow). So, while the question of the 
Act's constitutionality as applied to Coltec may be moot, Coltec's appeal 
of the denial of its Rule 60(b) motion is not. 
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the dismissal order, not from the Stipulation. Courts have 
generally held that dismissals with prejudice are not 
prospective within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5). See, e.g., 
Maraziti v. Thorpe, 52 F.3d 252, 254 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Schwartz v. United States, 976 F.2d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 
1992); Picco v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846, 851 
(5th Cir. 1990); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 
841 F.2d 1133, 1139-40 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Coltec cites no 
authority to the contrary. Instead, Coltec argues that the 
prospective effect of the dismissal prevents it from 
reasserting its constitutional claims and defenses. However, 
as the government notes, this collateral estoppel effect is 
common to all judgments. If this were enough to satisfy 
Rule 60(b)(5)'s threshold requirement, then the Rule's 
requirement of "prospective application" would be 
meaningless. 
 
Numerous courts have explicitly rejected this argument. 
See, e.g., Maraziti, 52 F.3d at 254 ("The construction . . . to 
the effect that a judgment has prospective effect so long as 
the parties are bound by it, would read the word 
`prospective' out of the rule.") (quotation omitted); Picco, 900 
F.2d at 851 ("The only arguably prospective effect of the . . . 
dismissal is that it precludes relitigation of the issues 
decided, which clearly is not enough."); Gibbs v. Maxwell 
House, 738 F.2d 1153, 1156 (11th Cir. 1984) ("That 
plaintiff remains bound by the dismissal is not a 
`prospective effect' within the meaning of rule 60(b)(5) any 
more than if plaintiff were continuing to feel the effects of 
a money judgment against him."). 
 
Coltec asserts that the prospective effect it describes is 
narrower than the collateral estoppel effect at issue in the 
above cases because the dismissal in this case was 
executory. This differs, it contends, from the judgment for 
monetary damages that had been paid and which this court 
determined was not prospective in Marshall, 575 F.2d 417.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Coltec also analogizes the District Court's interpretation of the 
Stipulation in this case to the judgment in United States v. Kayser-Roth 
Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 74, 79-80 (D.R.I. 2000) (judgment prospective as 
to damages when it fixed liability for waste clean-up but left amount of 
liability dependent on future events). But, as noted above, Coltec's Rule 
60(b) motion sought only to vacate the dismissal, not the Stipulation. 
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However, although the court in Marshall sustained the 
denial of Rule 60(b) relief when the judgment had already 
been satisfied, the court explicitly noted that even if the 
judgment had not yet been satisfied, it would not qualify as 
prospective under Rule 60(b)(5) because "[a]`prospective' 
injunction envisions a restraint of future conduct, not an 
order to remedy past wrongs when the compensation 
payment is withheld from the beneficiaries until some 
subsequent date." Marshall, 575 F.2d at 425 n.27. 
 
In fact, all of the cases Coltec cites which granted Rule 
60(b)(5) relief involved injunctions or consent decrees 
regulating ongoing behavior. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 
U.S. 203, 212 (1997) (injunction preventing certain manner 
of delivering publicly funded services to parochial school 
students); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 
367, 374-75 (1992) (consent decree mandating construction 
of new prison according to specific guidelines); Bellevue 
Manor Assocs. v. United States, 165 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (injunction mandating use of specific rent- 
subsidy calculation method); Marshall, 575 F.2d 417, 419 
(injunction requiring compliance with federal wage-and- 
hour law). 
 
Coltec's point that judgments are prospective when they 
are executory is not in dispute.14 There was nothing 
executory about the dismissal with prejudice of counts one 
through five. Even though there was no money judgment 
against Coltec at the time of its motion, it had previously 
assured the District Court that it was depositing into the 
escrow account the Coal Act premiums as they were due. 
See, e.g., App. at 151 ("Plaintiffs have held under escrow 
certain sums assessed to them for premiums for plan years 
February 1, 1993, October 1, 1993, and October 1, 1995."); 
App. at 170 (same); and App. at 198 ("[Coltec] has paid its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The United States cites a series of cases in support of this 
proposition. See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., 
Inc., 131 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding judgment not prospective 
that interpreted contract and continued to affect rights and duties of 
parties, and stating "[j]udgments are prospective when they are 
`executory' or `involve the supervision of changing conduct or 
conditions.' ") (quoting Twelve John Does , 841 F.2d at 1138); Maraziti, 
52 
F.3d 252, 254 (same). 
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Coal Act assessments since 1993 into an escrow account 
pending the resolution of the respective rights of the 
parties, and such monies remain in escrow. This escrow 
fund contains several million dollars."). It is disingenuous 
-- in light of Coltec's multiple false statements to both the 
District Court and the Fund about its escrow payments -- 
for Coltec to attempt to use its failure to make the promised 
payments to its own advantage. Therefore, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the 
dismissal did not satisfy Rule 60(b)(5)'s threshold 
requirement of prospective effect. 
 
2. Subsection (6) 
 
Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision which allows a court 
to relieve a party from the effects of an order for"any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). However, "[t]his court has 
consistently held that the Rule 60(b)(6) ground for relief 
from judgment provides for extraordinary relief and may 
only be invoked upon a showing of exceptional 
circumstances." In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 840 F.2d 
188 (3d Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted); see also United 
States Steel Corp. v. Fraternal Ass'n of Steel Haulers, 601 
F.2d 1269, 1274 (3d Cir. 1979); Marshall, 575 F.3d at 425. 
 
In rejecting Coltec's Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the District 
Court relied in large part on the fact that a change in law 
subsequent to the challenged order rarely justifies Rule 
60(b)(6) relief. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 239; Cincinnati Ins. 
Co., 131 F.3d at 628-29; Marshall, 575 F.3d at 425-26. In 
addition, as to the equities of Coltec's motion, the District 
Court found the company was trying to escape the effects 
of a bargain it regretted in hindsight and held that there 
were no exceptional circumstance that would justify 
allowing Coltec to renege on its deal. 
 
Coltec acknowledges that its decision voluntarily to 
dismiss its constitutional claims is an equitable factor 
militating against Rule 60(b)(6) relief,15  but argues that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Alternatively, Coltec appears to argue that the fact the court did not 
consider the merits of its constitutional claims in granting the dismissal 
at issue militates in favor of Rule 60(b) relief, citing Lasky v. 
Continental 
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District Court abused its discretion by giving determinative 
weight to this factor. Likewise, Coltec concedes that a 
change in decisional law is not alone sufficient to justify 
Rule 60(b) relief, but contends that the District Court 
abused its discretion by erroneously concluding that a 
change in law cannot support such relief and declining 
further to consider the equities of the company's motion. 
Coltec underscores that the new law in this case was a 
Supreme Court decision based on a finding of 
unconstitutionality. 
 
In its ruling denying Rule 60(b) relief, the District Court 
noted that decisional law cannot alone justify such relief 
and that Coltec had consented to the dismissal. See, e.g., 
App. at 190 ("Failing to litigate to its conclusion a matter 
that could have been pursued . . . all the way to the 
Supreme Court does not constitute an exceptional 
circumstance."); App. at 193 ("[A] change in the decisional 
law after judgment is entered . . . is not considered 
exceptional and does not justify relief."). However, the 
District Court considered other equitable factors in the 
remainder of its opinion, most notably the content and 
context of the parties' agreement leading to the dismissal. 
Even if the District Court could have been more explicit in 
its analysis of the equitable factors, it did not abuse its 
discretion, particularly since it focused on the principal 
issue of whether Coltec should be excused from the effects 
of a deal it voluntarily made. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Products Corp., 804 F.2d 250, 256 n.10 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[I]f relief is 
sought from a default judgment or a judgment of dismissal where there 
has been no consideration of the merits, [the court should consider] 
whether in the particular case the interest of deciding cases on the 
merits outweighs the interest in orderly procedure and in the finality of 
judgments, and whether there is merit in the defense or claim, as the 
case may be.") (quotation omitted). 
 
In light of the voluminous case law mandating a high hurdle for Rule 
60(b) relief from consensual orders, see, e.g. , Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383, 
Bellevue, 165 F.3d at 1253 n.4, Phila. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 
F.2d 1114, 1119-20 (3d Cir. 1979), this dictum from Lasky is better 
understood as applying to adjudications on procedural grounds rather 
than consensual orders like the dismissal in this case. 
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For purposes of an equitable analysis, the dismissal in 
this case should be viewed in the context of the Stipulation 
which precipitated it. As the District Court noted, the 
parties to the Stipulation clearly knew how to provide for 
contingencies such as future case law (i.e., NMA ) and knew 
that there were still pending constitutional challenges to 
the Coal Act. Coltec decided not to condition the dismissal 
of its constitutional claims on the ultimate outcome of 
these challenges, but deliberately forfeited its still viable 
constitutional claims, apparently because it believed they 
were unlikely to be successful in light of then-existing case 
law. It did so in exchange for valuable consideration in the 
form of a chance to pursue without litigation its premium 
differential claim, which it presumably believed it had a 
better chance of winning. In retrospect in light of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Eastern, Coltec may wish that 
it had not made this deal, but courts have not looked 
favorably on the entreaties of parties trying to escape the 
consequences of their own "counseled and knowledgeable" 
decisions. Fine Paper, 840 F.2d at 195. 
 
Coltec's situation is analogous to the circumstances of 
other Rule 60(b) movants whose motions courts have 
denied in large part because of their deliberate decisions 
not to appeal unfavorable adjudications. See, e.g., id. at 
188 (involving attorneys who chose not to appeal fee award 
others appealed); Marshall, 575 F.2d at 420 (involving 
school board that paid judgment after appeal rather than 
petitioning for certiorari). The Supreme Court addressed 
this situation in Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 
(1950), which involved the denaturalization of two 
naturalized German citizens during World War II. For 
monetary reasons, Ackermann declined to appeal, believing 
the issue would be resolved after the war. When the appeal 
of his brother-in-law, Keilbar, was successful, Ackermann 
filed for Rule 60(b) relief from his denaturalization. The 
Supreme Court held such relief was appropriately denied, 
explaining: 
 
       Petitioner made a considered choice not to appeal, 
       apparently because he did not feel that an appeal 
       would prove to be worth what he thought was a 
       required sacrifice of his home. His choice was a risk, 
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       but calculated and deliberate and such as follows a 
       free choice. Petitioner cannot be relieved of such a 
       choice because hindsight seems to indicate to him that 
       his decision not to appeal was probably wrong, 
       considering the outcome of the Keilbar case. There 
       must be an end to litigation someday, and free, 
       calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved 
       from. 
 
Id. at 198. 
 
Likewise, even if Coltec's decision to settle was 
improvident in hindsight, the decision has been made and 
cannot be revisited. Cf. Schwartz, 976 F.2d at 218 ("We find 
no meaningful distinction between a motion asking for relief 
from a decision not to appeal, as in Ackermann , and one 
that asks for relief from a decision to settle, as in this 
case."). The Court contrasted Ackermann's case to that of 
the successful Rule 60(b) petitioner in Klapprott v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949), who also had failed to defend 
denaturalization charges but who had been in custody, 
sick, unable to procure counsel despite efforts to do so, and 
preoccupied by efforts to protect himself against grave 
criminal charges. Ackermann, 340 U.S. at 199-200. The 
Court observed, "By no stretch of imagination can the 
voluntary, deliberate, free, untrammeled choice of petitioner 
not to appeal compare with the Klapprott situation." Id. at 
200. The District Court did not err in determining that 
Coltec similarly must bear the consequences of its 
informed, counseled and voluntary decision. 
 
Our decision in Boughner, 572 F.2d 976, which Coltec 
cites, granting Rule 60(b) relief, is distinguishable from the 
facts of the present case. The Boughner appellants had lost 
summary judgment motions because their attorney, who 
failed to file opposing papers, was inexcusably negligent. Id. 
at 977. Coltec, unlike these litigants, deliberately chose to 
negotiate away its constitutional claims while actively 
represented by competent counsel. 
 
Coltec also argues that it should not be punished for 
serving the interests of judicial economy by bowing to the 
weight of then-existing decisional law holding the Coal Act 
constitutional instead of continuing constitutional litigation 
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would have been borderline frivolous. It appeals to this 
court's sense of justice, claiming that it is fundamentally 
unfair for it to be forced to pay unconstitutional Coal Act 
premiums when the government has waived the premiums 
of companies that had not yet paid the premiums and 
refunded premiums of companies that settled before 
Eastern. See Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trustees of the 
UMWA Combined Benefit Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 523 (6th Cir. 
2001). 
 
The Fund responds that Coltec is not similarly situated 
to the companies that did not settle because Coltec got the 
benefit of its bargain and, had Eastern turned out 
differently, it might have been in a better position than 
companies that did not settle. We agree. Enforcing Coltec's 
bargain is not a punishment and is not unfair. Moreover, 
this court has already rejected such disparate treatment of 
"similarly" situated parties as a basis for Rule 60(b) relief. 
We stated, "The only showing made in support of Rule 60(b) 
relief in this case is that litigants who pursued appellate 
remedies fared better than litigants who did not. The 
Marshall case explicitly forecloses Rule 60(b) relief on that 
ground." Fine Paper, 840 F.2d at 194. 
 
The United States further contends that if Coltec prevails, 
the government will have no incentive to settle 
constitutional cases. The government persuasively argues 
that if Coltec is allowed to renege on the Stipulation and 
the Agreement, then: 
 
       any settlement involving the abandonment of 
       constitutional claims would be illusory [and][a]ny 
       party that bargained away constitutional claims that 
       later turned out to have merit could renege on its 
       agreement. As a result, the United States would have 
       no incentive to enter into settlement agreements in 
       [such] cases, and litigants would lose the ability to 
       trade constitutional claims -- even highly questionable 
       ones -- for valuable consideration. [Further,] . . . the 
       courts would be inundated with constitutional claims 
       which could no longer be settled as well as parties 
       seeking to reopen long-closed cases based on more 
       recent precedent. 
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Br. of United States at 12. 
 
Finally, Coltec claims that the Fund will suffer no undue 
prejudice if Rule 60(b) relief is granted. To the contrary, the 
Fund would in fact lose the benefit of the bargain it made 
with Coltec. Like Coltec, the Fund took a deliberate risk -- 
which in fact materialized when it lost NMA-- in exchange 
for a particular benefit, the security of the contemplated 
escrow. If Coltec were to prevail, the Fund would be 
prejudiced by losing the benefit it earned. For these 
reasons, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
failing to grant Coltec's Rule 60(b) motion.16 
 
3. Other Post-Eastern Rulings on Rule 60(b) Motions by 
       Coal Companies 
 
Our conclusion that the District Court properly denied 
Coltec's Rule 60(b) motion is in line with the decisions of 
the other courts that denied relief sought by companies 
which settled or paid premiums pursuant to final 
judgments before Eastern. In Blue Diamond Coal, a coal 
company that had paid the Coal Act premiums it owed after 
unsuccessfully litigating its constitutional claims all the 
way to the Supreme Court, Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. 
Chater, 519 U.S. 1055 (1997) (denying writ of certiorari), 
moved for Rule 60(b)(6) relief. The district court granted 
relief, Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Shalala (In re Blue Diamond 
Coal Co.), No. 3:93-CV-473, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22711 
(E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 1998), but the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that a change in decisional 
law, even when based on constitutional principles, is 
generally insufficient to justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Blue 
Diamond Coal Co., 249 F.3d at 524. It rejected the district 
court's analogy to a line of cases which establishes that 
post-judgment relief may be granted when litigants involved 
in the same transaction or injury get divergent judgments 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Additionally, the District Court's denial of Coltec's motion for 
reconsideration based on the SSA letter was not an abuse of discretion. 
The letter was not "new evidence" in that Coltec received it while the 
Rule 60(b) motion was under consideration by the court. Moreover, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion because the letter is an 
extension of the Eastern decision; to the extent Eastern does not justify 
Rule 60(b) relief, neither does the SSA letter. 
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due to a change in decisional law, see id. at 525, because 
those cases involve "transactions with a much tighter nexus 
. . . than a law passed by Congress to regulate the payment 
of medical health benefits to the retirees of an entire 
industry." Id. at 526. It also found that the equities favored 
denial of relief, citing the general interest in finality. The 
Court of Appeals noted that the judgment had been fully 
executed before Eastern was decided. See also Templeton 
Coal Co. v. Apfel, No. 93-158 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 1999) 
(denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief to coal company that had lost 
its constitutional challenge in district and circuit court and 
filed a petition for certiorari which was denied by the 
Supreme Court); Davon, Inc. v. Apfel, No. 93-198 (S.D. Ind. 
Nov. 17, 1999) (same). 
 
The case with the facts most similar to this one is 
Holland v. Virginia Lee Co., 188 F.R.D. 241 (W.D. Va. 1999). 
Virginia Lee had paid the Fund a set amount in settlement 
of all past and future premium liability before there was 
any binding law in the Fourth Circuit as to the 
constitutionality of the Coal Act. The district court in 
Virginia Lee denied the company's Rule 60(b)(6) motion, 
finding that it had no grounds for relief from its voluntary 
settlement and could not otherwise show extraordinary 
circumstances. The court emphasized the extraordinary 
nature of subsection (6) relief, noting that a change in law 
does not, alone, justify such relief, even when the change is 
based on constitutional principles, and it rejected various 
fairness arguments similar to those made by Coltec here. 
Id. at 254-55. The court also rejected the companies' 
argument that their SSA letters justified relief, finding that 
these letters were not meant to affect final judgments and 
that, in any case, the SSA does not have the authority to do 
so. Id. at 256; see also Lindsey Coal Mining Co. Liquidating 
Trust v. Apfel, No. 94-143 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1999) (denying 
relief to a coal company that lost its constitutional 
challenge in district and appeals court and did not petition 
for certiorari, based in part on the District Court's denial 
here). 
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C. The District Court's Award of Seven Million Dollars to 
       the Fund  
 
Coltec argues that the District Court had no "jurisdiction" 
to award monetary damages to the Fund because the Fund 
did not request any monetary damages and did not prevail 
on its one declaratory judgment counterclaim.17 In 
response, the Fund points out that it asked for such relief 
as was just, and argues that the judgment is authorized by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) which provides that 
"every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the 
party has not demanded such relief in the party's 
pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c); see also Kirby v. HUD, 745 
F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1984) ("As long as the plaintiffs have 
stated a claim for relief, it is the court's obligation to grant 
the relief to which the prevailing party is entitled whether 
it has been specifically demanded or not."). 
 
In awarding the Fund some seven million dollars, the 
District Court enforced the "so ordered" Stipulation and the 
Agreement, and the court certainly had the authority to do 
so. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 901 
F.2d 311, 317 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that courts have 
jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements incorporated 
into orders); Washington Hosp. v. White, 889 F.2d 1294, 
1299 n.9 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that the fact that court 
had "so ordered" stipulation gave document"the same 
effect as a consent order or consent decree" and gave the 
court jurisdiction to enforce it). As the Fund argues, its 
entitlement to pre-Eastern premiums arises from the 
Agreement, not the Coal Act. This renders irrelevant 
Coltec's lengthy discussion of the court's lack of authority 
under the Coal Act to impose liability on it. The real issue 
is whether the Stipulation, in conjunction with the 
Agreement, which was "so ordered," authorizes the 
judgment imposed by the court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Coltec also asserts it would be illegal for it to pay the Fund without 
Coal Act liability, under the Labor Management Relations Act S 302, 29 
U.S.C. S 186 (barring employer gifts to labor organizations). However, 
S 302(c)(2) exempts "payment . . . of any money . . . in satisfaction of a 
judgment of any court . . . or in compromise, adjustment, settlement, or 
release of any claim." 29 U.S.C. S 186(c)(2). 
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Coltec contends that the Stipulation does not provide a 
basis for the award. It asserts that the document is 
unambiguous and very limited, arguing that no language in 
the Stipulation can be construed as an admission of 
liability, an acknowledgment that any of its retiree 
assignments or premium assessments are valid, or an 
agreement to make premium payments. It claims that the 
District Court erroneously augmented the plain meaning of 
the Stipulation by resorting to the "context" of the 
document when there had been no showing of any 
ambiguity. We reject this contention. As we previously 
noted, the language of the Agreement and Stipulation 
supports the District Court's interpretation of the parties' 
deal. Simply put, the Fund is entitled to the money 
pursuant to the parties' bargain. 
 
The District Court's finding that the Fund was, in these 
circumstances, entitled to the disbursement it requested is 
unexceptional. Coltec argues, however, that the Agreement 
and the Stipulation reference "Coal Act premiums" and 
that, in light of the SSA letter, it did not have any statutory 
premium liability at the time of the judgment. This 
argument is easily disposed of because the premiums 
referred to in the Stipulation and the Agreement clearly 
refer to the premiums due before Eastern was decided. App. 
at 232. 
 
IV. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, Coltec made a binding agreement with the Fund 
when it signed the Agreement, the Escrow Agreement, and 
the Stipulation. The District Court found no basis in the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Eastern to allow Coltec to back 
out of its agreements, nor do we. Because Coltec failed to 
open and maintain the escrow account as represented to 
the court and to the Fund, Coltec does not deserve relief 
from the agreements it freely entered. 
 
For the reasons described herein, the order and the 
judgment of the District Court are affirmed. 
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